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Abstract 
For a qualitative system sound security practices must be a 
crucial part throughout the entire software lifecycle. 
Furthermore, agile software development has paved the way for 
overcoming the problems faced by developers during traditional 
development process. In the given paper we are using an Agile 
Security Framework that is compatible with practices of agile 
processes and inherit in it the benefits of security engineering 
activities in the form of risk assessment and threat prioritization. 
One of the most popular techniques to deal with ever growing 
risks associated with security threats is DREAD model. It is used 
for rating risk of threats identified in the abuser stories. In this 
model threats needs to be defined by sharp cutoffs. However, 
such precise distribution is not suitable for risk categorization as 
risks are vague in nature and deals with high level of uncertainty. 
In view of these risk factors, our paper proposes a novel fuzzy 
approach using DREAD model for computing risk level that 
ensures better evaluation of imprecise concepts. Thus it provides 
the capacity to include subjectivity and uncertainty during risk 
ranking. A case study has been presented to illustrate and 
compare the proposed approach with the existing one using 
Matlab. 
Keywords: Fuzzy logic, Agile Security Framework, Risk 
ranking, DREAD Model, Fuzzy Inference System. 
1. Introduction 
System security is one of the most significant issues in 
today’s software society. Several security threats arise 
during software development process. Software failures, 
due to various vulnerabilities present in software, suggest 
essential presence of security in every phase of software 
development method. It is observed that developers prefer 
to adopt agile methods for software development as 
compared to traditional development processes as agile 
methods provides software development at fast pace and 
ever-changing. Agile processes are gaining popularity 
mainly during development of web applications as 
prevailing conditions recognize that here changes are 
inevitable and security risks are more prominent. Agile 
methodology a lightweight, iterative approach understands 
the need of current time, encouraging changes in 
requirements at any stage in software development 
lifecycle. However, integration of security measures with 
agile processes imposes several constraints making it 
imperative that these integration problems are analyzed 
carefully. 
Sonia et al. [1] proposed an Agile Security Framework 
(ASF), an iterative framework presenting step by step 
guidance for applying security techniques wherein agility 
is maintained by providing flexibility in implementing 
changes at any stage. In the given framework, a hybrid 
technique has been suggested that combines abuser stories 
with attack trees to map security requirements. Moreover, 
a security framework that helps in categorizing security 
requirements has also been provided in ASF for different 
iterations. This framework continues to evolve and to be 
applied in better way integrating security activities 
wherever possible to get a complete secure system. There, 
in phase 2 of threat modeling and designing we focus just 
on one aspect of it that is, risk assessment and 
prioritization. This step deals with assigning risk rating. It 
gives high risk value, if threat poses significant risk and 
need to be addressed immediately.  
Microsoft’s DREAD model is a popular approach for 
computing risk level of threats but it a llows only crisp 
values [7]. Virtually every risk element can be 
characterized using two metrics, “Low, Medium, and 
High,” or through “Ordinal Ranking.” [2]. Therefore most 
appropriate approach for defining risk level is using fuzzy 
logic. In this truth or validity of any statement becomes its 
degree of belongingness or membership. This degree 
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corresponds to a v alue to which an object is similar or 
compatible with the concept represented by fuzzy set. 
Truthfulness of a s tatement can be of various degrees 
which ranges from completely true, to partially true and 
then to completely false [2]. Moreover, fuzzy logic has 
linguistic values taken as words which can represent 
natural language for human reasoning during fuzzy rules 
construction. Thus, our approach based on fuzzy logic, can 
easily deals with ambiguities and uncertainties posed by 
imprecise concepts. After threats are prioritized based on 
risk rating, appropriate action is taken to manage that 
particular risk. Ways listed under risk management 
includes risk acceptance, risk transference, risk removal 
and the last one is to mitigate risk by countermeasures [5]. 
Various steps for computing risk rating with overall 
process for threat prioritization using fuzzy approach is 
illustrated in Fig. 1. 
 
Threat
Prioritization
Development of
 Fuzzy Rule Base
Defining & fuzzifying
linguistic variables
Defining input/
output variables
Aggregate All Outputs
Implementing
Fuzzy Approach
Categorize threats
using STRIDE model
Risk Assessment &
Fuzzy Logic Approach
for Threat Priortization
using DREAD Model
Identify Assets &
formulate Abuser Stories
Analyze & Identify
threats in abuser stories
Defuzzification
   
Fig. 1 Overall Threat Prioritization Process 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents the related work in the concerned field. 
Section 3 provides a brief overview required to understand 
our approach. Section 4 describes our proposed fuzzy 
approach. Application of our approach with a b rief case 
study represented in Section 5, and Section 6 presents 
conclusion and future work. 
2. Overview of Existing Literature 
Various publications presents security guidelines for 
software development and among them several proposals 
had delivered a quality work for implementing security in 
agile software development. Mikko Siponen has explained 
that how security techniques can be added seamlessly to 
agile software development using an agile method, named 
Feature Driven Development [3]. Gustav Bostrom et al. 
had proposed a method of extending extreme programming 
to support security requirements engineering [4]. In [5], 
Suvda Myagmar has described threat modeling as a basis 
of security requirements. K. Ram Mohan Rao has done 
improvement in security by giving a web application risk 
assessment technique called threat risk modeling [6]. 
Microsoft used a DREAD model for assessing each threats 
relative risk [7]. Supreeth Venkataraman has prioritized 
threats using k/m algebra [8]. Several researchers have put 
forward an idea of implementing fuzzy logic for threat 
modeling. Fuzzy set theory was established by Lofti Zadeh 
in 1965 and he later provides some advance techniques in 
fuzzy approach for dealing with complex systems [9, 10].  
Klir and Kosko further contributed by giving uncertainty 
and fuzzy rule base concept. They concluded that that 
probabilities for mutually exclusive events cannot add up 
to more than 1, but their fuzzy values can be like that [11, 
12]. A.S. Sodiya, et al. have presented a f uzzy logic 
technique used to identify potential threats to computer 
based systems [13]. Other researchers have also focused on 
applying risk analysis in various applications using fuzzy 
logic [14]. But till now there is no study which provides 
fuzzy approach for threat risk ranking using DREAD 
model. Keeping these points in mind, we are proposing 
novel approach which will provide risk rating using fuzzy 
inference system. 
3. Background 
 3.1 Agile Security Framework 
To understand the amendments we have done in ASF it is 
necessary to first get the basic knowledge about the given 
framework [1]. As indicated by its name that, ASF is an 
iterative framework addressing security at various stages of 
its security development lifecycle to get a complete secure 
system. Here agility is maintained by providing flexibility 
in implementing changes at any stage. ASD is adaptive in 
nature, supporting continuous changes and produces 
working software at the end of each iteration. This 
framework is developed after keeping in mind all this 
aspects. As dealing with lightweight approach, even threat 
modeling process in this framework has time constraints, 
therefore it includes only current stories. It minimizes the 
development time and provides a w ay of keeping agile 
processes and security practices over a s ingle platform. 
This framework also suggests some key points which assist 
in providing iterative development to it. One of the key 
points describes that during first iteration, a security 
framework for categorizing abuser stories (which identify 
threats) is to be developed, which helps developer in 
understanding which story is to be implemented in which 
iteration. Another point discusses that initial iteration starts 
with release planning defining scope of whole project 
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involving security requirements of complete system. ASF 
comprises of various phases from which phase 1 a nd 2 
briefly describe some steps of Security analysis and Threat 
Modeling which will serve as a baseline for our approach. 
All 5 phases of ASF are explained in brief below 
  
Phase 1 - Security requirements analysis & planning: 
The main purpose of this phase is to identify critical assets 
and then formulate abuser stories describing undesired 
behavior of the system. Various steps included in this 
phase are as follows  
A. Critical asset identification & formulation of abuser 
stories: Assets are resources that must be protected by 
system from an unauthorized user or an attacker. 
Initially developer identifies critical assets and 
important security features required by customers for 
developing abuser stories. After that developer will 
address some abuser stories and security user stories 
with constraints. These stories will illustrate how 
existing protective measures could be neglected or 
where a lack of such protection exists. 
B. Analyzing and Identifying threats: Based on determined 
assets, security user stories and abuser stories, 
developers then determines potential attacks or threats 
by which adversary might try to affect an asset. After 
enumeration and identification, these threats can be 
categorized into six categories based on their effect 
using Microsoft’s STRIDE model [7]. 
 
Phase 2 - Threat Modeling and Designing:   
 
Given phase describes Threat Modeling and Designing, 
which act as foundation for specification of security 
requirements. Security design process includes threat 
analysis, various techniques to manage and mitigate risks and 
finally translate security requirements into reality. Now we 
will describe main stages comes under threat modeling and 
designing  
 
A. Risk Assessment and Threat Prioritization: Each threat 
also has risk associated with it. For a threat identified in 
abuser stories, risk assessment is performed to map 
each threat either into mitigation mechanism or an 
assumption that it is  not worth worrying about [4]. To 
formalize this process a list of priority with overall 
rating of threats is generated. We can compute the risk 
to an asset in conventional manner using a formula 
[15]. 
Risk = Impact * Probability 
It uses probability based quantitative method. It has a 
drawback that estimating impact and probability is 
frequently difficult and team members usually will not 
agree on rating system giving equal distribution of the 
assets. To resolve this, Microsoft uses a DREAD model 
to compute a risk value for prioritization of threats. 
This model calculates security risks as an average of 
numeric values, assigned to each of the following 
categories. 
• Damage potential: Rates the extent of the damage 
if attack succeeded. 
• Reproducibility: Ranks how often an effort to 
reproduce an attack works. 
• Exploitability: Estimate the value for the effort 
needed to exploit the threat. 
• Affected users: Estimate fraction of installations 
affected if an exploit widely available. 
• Discoverability: Measures that how easy is it to  
discover the vulnerability by an attacker. 
Although this method is extremely popular till present 
day but it a llows exactly defined distributions or crisp 
boundaries. In this method, it is  not possible to 
determine degree of belongingness for a particular 
threat risk. Therefore most appropriate approach for 
defining risk level is to express it in terms of linguistic 
variables and membership function used in fuzzy logic. 
Here membership grades are often represented by real 
numbers varying in closed interval between 0 and 1. 
Thus, in the given paper we are trying to improve the 
method suggested in ASF by giving a fuzzy approach 
for threat prioritization. Experimental Results of our 
extension suggest that it helps developers in dealing 
with imprecise data, ambiguities and uncertainties more 
efficiently as compared to existing one. 
B. Requirements Elicitation using a Hybrid Technique  
After threat prioritization, a Hybrid Technique for 
requirements elicitation is explained in ASF. The 
purpose of this technique is to map the threats 
identified for mitigation into security requirements 
using agile methodology. It achieves this by combining 
the strengths of abuser stories and attack trees. This 
phase ends with designing security requirements.  
  
Phase 3- Secure code Implementation: Here they have 
used Test Driven Development where series of unit test are 
included for security stories of current sprint 
implementation. 
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Table 1: Linguistic Variables and their ranges 
 
Phase 4- Security Testing: It includes unit testing, 
acceptance testing, fuzz testing and penetration testing. 
 
Phase 5- Secure Deployment: Here deployment of 
current iteration takes place and with that planning for next 
iteration starts. 
As explained above ASF has various phases incorporating 
security into every stage of software development. Here, 
we are extending the work of ASF by providing a fuzzy 
approach in phase 2 that comprises threat prioritization 
based on risk during threat modeling. This approach is 
compatible with practices of agile processes and inherits 
benefits of security engineering activities in the form of 
risk assessment and threat prioritization. We will discuss 
our fuzzy approach in detail in next sections. 
4. Proposed Fuzzy Logic Implementation 
In this approach, a fuzzy logic based technique is designed 
using fuzzy inference system to determine the risk rate 
using parameters of DREAD model associated with each 
threat. Fuzzy inference system is a co mputer paradigm 
implying a collection of fuzzy membership function, rules 
and reasoning. There are three common inference systems 
known. These are Mamdani Fuzzy models, Sugeno Fuzzy 
Models, Tsukamoto Fuzzy models. In our approach we are 
using Mamdani Fuzzy model as it is best suitable to adapt 
our approach. This fuzzy logic approach proceeds in 
several steps as shown below. 
4.1 Defining Input/ Output Variables 
For assessing risk level, a risk rating model such as 
Microsoft’s DREAD model can be used, that defines input 
variables as damage potential, reproducibility of attack, 
exploitability of the vulnerability, number of affected users 
and discoverability of vulnerability. Output variable 
determines risk level associated with a threat. Initially this 
crisp value is a real number according to universe of scope.  
Value obtained for each of the input variable is defined by 
fuzzy number using suitable fuzzy sets.  
4.2 Designing and fuzzifying linguistic variables  
Like crisp input values take on numeric values, in the same 
way linguistic variables have linguistic values taken as 
words in the fuzzy logic. In fuzzy logic, for each input 
variable fuzzy sets are defined as linguistic variables are 
divided into certain categories as shown in Table1. In each 
case input parameters range from 0 to 10 while for output 
range is from 0 to 50.For fuzzification of input parameters, 
we will define fuzzy membership value for each of the sets 
using a set diagram called as fuzzy membership curve that 
graphically defines each of the linguistic value and defines 
the way in which each point in the input space is mapped 
to a membership value between 0 and 1. There are several 
types of membership function. Here we are using triangular 
membership function (special case of trapezoidal 
membership function) since they are well suited for 
modeling and designing. 
 
 
S. 
No. 
 
 
Linguistic 
Value & 
Range 
Linguistic 
Value & 
Range 
Linguistic 
Value & 
Range 
Linguistic 
Value & 
Range 
Linguistic 
Value & 
Range 
                      
1 Damage Potential  (DP) 
Negligible Slight Moderate Almost Catastrophic 
0-2 1-4 3-6 5-8 7-10 
2 Reproducibility  (R) 
Probably Likelihood Satisfiable Critical Vital 
0-2.5 1.5-4 3.5-6 5.5-8 7.5-10 
3 Exploitability  (E) 
Least Slight Moderate Almost Extreme 
0-3 2-5 4-7 6-9 8-10 
4 Affected users (AU) 
Noticeable Satisfactory Average Disturbing Unbearable 
0-2 1-4 3-6 5-8 7-10 
5 Discoverability (D) 
Least Slight Moderate Almost Extreme 
0-2 1.5-5 3.5-7 5.5-9 7.5-10 
6 
Fuzzy Risk Level 
(Output Variable) 
Very 
Low 
Low 
Somewhat 
Low 
(S_WLow) 
Medium 
Somewhat 
High 
(S_WHigh) 
High Very High 
0-10 7-17 14-24 21-31 28-37 35-43 40-50 
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Table 2: Comparison showing Risk level using conventional approach and Fuzzy Approach 
Threat D R E A D Total Average Rating 
Fuzzy Risk 
value 
Fuzzy Risk level 
Blind SQL Injection 9 6 8 9 6 38 7.60 High 39 High (6th category) 
Login Page SQL Injection 9 6 8 9 6 38 7.60 High 39 High (6th category) 
Unencrypted login request 6 4 6 5 5 26 5.2 Medium 32.5 
Somewhat High   
(5th category) 
Application Error 2 1 3 2 3 11 2.2 Low 19 
Somewhat Low  
(3rd  category) 
Inadequate account lockout 2 1 3 2 3 11 2.2 Low 19 
Somewhat Low 
(3rd  category) 
Permanent cookie contains 
sensitive session information 
2 1 3 2 3 11 2.2 Low 19 
Somewhat Low 
(3rd  category) 
Session information not updated 2 1 3 2 3 11 2.2 Low 19 
Somewhat Low 
(3rd  category) 
Unencrypted password 
Parameter 
2 1 3 2 3 11 2.2 Low 19 
Somewhat Low 
(3rd  category) 
Unencrypted viewstate 
Parameter 
2 1 3 2 3 11 2.2 Low 19 
Somewhat Low 
(3rd  category) 
4.3 Development of Fuzzy rule base  
If-then rules are framed to reflect relationship between 
input variables taken as antecedents and output variable 
taken as consequent of the fuzzy rules. Given input 
variables specified as ‘IF’ part of rule and output variable 
(fuzzy risk level) is taken as ‘THEN’ part of rule. In our 
approach there are multiple input variables. That’s why we 
are using AND operator here for mapping of five inputs to 
one output. Rules designed in the rule base of FIS can be 
represented in general as 
 
IF (Linguistic Variable1 IS Linguistic Value1) AND 
(Linguistic Variable2 IS Linguistic Value2) THEN 
(Linguistic Variable3 IS Linguistic Value3) 
 
4.4 Aggregate all outputs  
During aggregation outputs of each rule are unified. Here, 
the input for the aggregation process is truncated output 
fuzzy sets returned by the implication process for each rule. 
The output of the aggregation process is the combined 
output fuzzy set. Here we consider method which computes 
maximum of each rule’s output set. 
4.5 Defuzzification 
It converts the fuzzy output of the inference engine to crisp 
single output value. Five commonly used defuzzifying 
methods are Centroid of area (COA), Bisector of area 
(BOA), Mean of maximum (MOM), Smallest of maximum 
(SOM), Largest of maximum (LOM). From these methods 
we are using COA. The input for the defuzzification is a 
fuzzy set and the output of the process is a value obtained 
by using a defuzzification method. 
 
 
After getting risk level, priority for threats can be specified. 
It can be further used for managing threats by risk 
acceptance, risk transference, risk removal and for the 
highest value designer must go for risk mitigation. This is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
5. Case Study 
In this section we briefly describe the case study that 
explores the ramifications of our proposed fuzzy approach 
by applying it to existing results of a conventional DREAD 
model technique. We have implemented our approach using 
Matlab. 
Keeping focus on our goal we first provide an overview of 
our sample data which calculates risk rating using 
conventional DREAD model on Geospatial Weather 
Information System (GWIS). GWIS is a web based tool 
used for performing various operations of weather climatic 
data. It integrates the weather related information from 
different available sources and organizes the data in 
structural GWIS format as explained in [6]. In this paper 
[6] computation of risk level has been done using 
conventional DREAD model as shown in Table 2. 
For our case study we consider same values of threats and 
DREAD attributes so that we can compare consequences of 
risk rating from conventional DREAD model approach with 
that of our fuzzy approach. Initially using FIS editor of 
matlab fuzzy toolbox we can define input - output names 
and also specify different methods and model to be used 
throughout our implementation as shown in Fig.2. The 
process of defining linguistic values and their respective 
ranges is shown in Table 1 as required for GWIS. Then 
using Membership function editor we represent membership 
function of each input parameter corresponding to its range, 
as given   in Fig. 3   and   4 for input   parameter   damage  
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Fig. 2 Representing mapping of inputs to the inference system type and 
then to the output using FIS editor 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Membership function editor for Output Risk Level 
 
potential and output Risk level. The representations for 
other input variables can be done in similar way. 
More the number of intervals more will be the resolution 
and preciseness but it is at the cost of computational 
complexity. Therefore, to balance between the two we are 
using 5 categories for each linguistic variable, which results 
into 1225 rules if we consider all input parameters for rule 
framing.  Just few rules may contribute in actual evaluation 
process based on the input parameter values. However, for 
a single threat more than one fuzzy rule may apply. 
Here, we are considering Blind SQL injection threat from 
Table 2 having values D=9, R=6, E=8, A=9, D=6. In this 
case, 8 rules are developed whose implementation has been  
 
 
Fig. 3  Membership function editor for Damage Potential 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Rule Editor 
 
done using fuzzy conditional statement. Some of them are 
shown below: 
1. If (Damage Potential is Catastrophic) AND 
(Reproducibility is Satisfiable) AND 
(Exploitability is Almost) AND (Affected Users is 
Unbearable) AND (Discoverability is Moderate) 
then (Risk Level is S_WHigh). 
2. If (Damage Potential is Catastrophic) AND 
(Reproducibility is Satisfiable) AND 
(Exploitability is Almost) AND (Affected Users is 
Unbearable) AND (Discoverability is Almost) then 
(Risk Level is High).  
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----------------------- 
----------------------- 
----------------------- 
----------------------- 
7. If (Damage Potential is Catastrophic) AND 
(Reproducibility is Critical) AND (Exploitability 
is Extreme) AND (Affected Users is Unbearable) 
AND (Discoverability is Moderate) then (Risk 
Level is High).  
8. If (Damage Potential is Catastrophic) AND 
(Reproducibility is Critical) AND (Exploitability 
is Extreme) AND (Affected Users is Unbearable) 
AND (Discoverability is Almost) then (Risk Level 
is VeryHigh).  
Now, we can define fuzzy membership value for each set 
using membership function diagram as shown in Fig. 3, 4. 
The fuzzification output can be represented as: 
1 Damage Potential at 9 have µDP = 1 f or 
‘Catastrophic’ membership function AND 
Reproducibility at 6 have µR = 0.3 for ‘Critical’ 
membership function AND  
Exploitability at 8 have µE = 0.7 for ‘Almost’ 
membership function AND  
Affected Users at 9 have µAU = 1 for ‘unbearable’ 
membership function AND  
Discoverability at 6 have µD = .65 for ‘Moderate’ 
membership function.  
 
2 Damage Potential at 9 have µDP = 1 f or 
‘Catastrophic’ membership function AND 
Reproducibility at 6 have µR = 0.1 for ‘Critical’ 
membership function AND  
Exploitability at 8 have µE = 0.7 for ‘Almost’ 
membership function AND  
Affected Users at 9 have µAU = 1 for ‘unbearable’ 
membership function AND  
Discoverability at 6 have µD = .65 for ‘Moderate’ 
membership function.  
 
----------------------- 
----------------------- 
----------------------- 
----------------------- 
 
8 Damage Potential at 9 have µDP = 1 f or    
‘Catastrophic’ membership function AND 
Reproducibility at 6 have µR = 0.3 for ‘Critical’ 
membership function AND 
Exploitability at 8 have µE = 0.7 for ‘Almost’ 
membership function AND  
Affected Users at 9 have µAU = 1 for ‘unbearable’ 
membership function AND  
Discoverability at 6 have to µD = .25 for ‘Almost’ 
membership function. 
 
After deriving these rules, AND fuzzy operator is used in 
between the antecedents of the rules. Therefore, minimum 
of all membership functions on antecedents side of a rule is 
calculated, which gives a single membership value. Using 
this membership value of antecedent side, the consequent 
side of risk is evaluated. Here, 8 rules are applied for Blind 
SQL injection threat and each applicable rule contributes a 
vote of membership. Weight applied to each rule is 1. 
Overall, 48 rules are used in our case study for the threats 
we considered as shown in Fig. 5. Finally, from rule viewer 
represented in Fig. 6, evaluation of output fuzzy risk level is 
performed for the threats faced by GWIS web tool. The 
computation of each threat is considered separately by 
giving input values of each parameter from Table 2. The 
last two columns of Table 2 represent fuzzy risk value we 
get by our approach and fuzzy rating we can assign to it    
Now we can compare the results obtained for risk level 
evaluation using conventional DREAD model and our 
fuzzy logic approach. We have discovered from Table 2 
that risk level obtained from our fuzzy approach is 
significantly more than that of existing results of 
conventional approach. Our study suggests that this is due 
to fact that conventional approach has sharp cutoffs for 
variables. That is, the member certainly belongs to a set or 
not which inferences that precision level required for this 
approach is too high. For example, suppose in given Table 
2 when a variable Total lies between the interval of 20 to 30 
then risk rate is medium. Now we consider a given threat of 
unencrypted login request which rates medium if total is 
exactly 20, 30 or  somewhere in between 20 to 30. But 
instead of that if its total is 19 then it arrives in low rating 
and if 31 then in high rating. It shows that just by a small 
change in some attribute of DREAD model class of risk 
rating gets deviated. Although values assigned to attributes 
are subjective quantities and can vary from person to person 
by 1 to 2 degrees. Introduction of such sharp boundaries is 
undesirable as risk is vague and uncertain term. Our fuzzy 
approach smoothes the edges and here transition takes place 
gradually. In fuzzy logic, a v ariable can be a member of 
multiple fuzzy sets having different degree of membership 
for each set. Therefore, it includes all the values for an 
object to which they belong in the fuzzy sets. But in 
traditional modeling only true values are considered and it 
ignores some values which are partially true. Thus here risk 
value arises less than that of fuzzy risk value. Also more 
than one fuzzy rule is applied as each applicable rule 
contributes a vote of membership. This all concludes that 
our approach is more effective for unpredictable risks and 
perhaps easier to implement. 
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Fig. 6  Rule Viewer computing Ouput by combining rules 
 
Furthermore, after careful analysis we can say that fuzzy 
approach is more efficient, flexible and having more 
tolerance for imprecise data and ambiguities like that of 
risk. For instance, as seen from Table 2 that rating for 
unencrypted login request for a web application GWIS is 
medium but after referring [16], we can see that same threat 
for a web application using DREAD itself gets high rating. 
That is, conventional DREAD model can lead to variations. 
Our new approach has been tested and verified for same 
values and rating results from it is ‘somewhat high’. Thus 
using fuzzy logic, we can capture the notion that risk of 
unencrypted login request is high to some degree (i.e 
somewhat high) and not medium as in conventional method, 
although not as high as that of other risks posing severe 
inevitable problems. Results represented in Table 2 for our 
fuzzy approach can describe various levels to be considered 
more or less based on severity rather than yes or no 
description. It also has the advantage of being simple to 
implement and qualitative in nature as it provides high level 
of abstractions by using linguistic labels. However, in 
conventional model, risk analysis is quantitative and for 
human beings mathematical formulation using numbers is 
more difficult. 
Our approach provides more resistance to the problems 
posed by uncertainties always associated with risks and also 
able to handle ambiguities effectively for threat 
prioritization. Therefore more severe threats can be 
addressed immediately during earlier stages. This prevents 
security engineers from facing complex and costly problems 
in later stages. 
6. Conclusion and Future Work 
For current software system it is worth saying that, sound 
security practices are enlightening but are not completely 
life savers. Our work refines the way of enforcing security 
in the well established Agile Security Framework. One of 
the major aspects perceived by ASF is risk assessment and 
threat prioritization. In common practice, the risk associated 
with threats are rated using DREAD model. In the given 
paper we are recommending a fuzzy approach for carrying 
out threat prioritization based on risk ranking. Here 
transition from member to non member is gradual rather 
than abrupt. It can easily deal with uncertain, ambiguous 
and vague risks as it a llows description of concepts by 
eliminating sharp boundaries between members of class 
from non members. So prioritization of threats based on 
risk level is more efficient, effective and simple. Use of 
fuzzy sets and their linguistic values during risk analysis 
make valuable contributions as they are able to represent 
abstractions, which is natural for human being instead of 
numbers. Although we have implemented our fuzzy 
approach in agile environment but it can also work perfectly 
in traditional development process. Here we have made an 
attempt to improve the concept of prioritizing threats but 
there is a great deal of work ahead for providing a perfect 
secure system. Threats selected for mitigation considers risk 
level and cost of recovery. Extensive security measures 
providing fewer benefits can increase the cost of system. 
This factor definitely provides a direction for future work. 
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